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aSSeSSing offSet Quality in the clean 
Development mechaniSm
by The Offset Quality Initiative*
* The Offset Quality Initiative consists of the following member organizations: 
The Climate Trust, founded to manage a portfolio of compliance-grade carbon 
projects as a result of Oregon’s leadership in passing the nation’s first legisla-
tion to limit carbon dioxide emissions, spearheads and leads the Offset Quality 
Initiative; The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, established in 1998 as 
a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and independent organization dedicated to providing 
credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to 
address global climate change; The Climate Action Reserve, a private nonprofit 
organization addressing climate change and bringing together participants from 
the government, environment and business sectors, directs the California Cli-
mate Action Registry, Climate Action Reserve and Center for Climate Action; 
The Environmental Resource Trust, co-founder of the American Carbon Reg-
istry, which in 2008 was the most widely used voluntary carbon market regis-
try in the world; Greenhouse Gas Management Institute, a registered nonprofit 
organization, trains, certifies, and networks a global community of experts that 
account, audit and manage GHG emissions based on world-class training and 
professional standards; and The Climate Group, an independent nonprofit orga-
nization that works with government and business leaders to accelerate the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, founded in 2004 with offices in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, China, India, and Australia.
InTroducTIon
The	Clean	Development	Mechanism	 (“CDM”),	 created	under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 generates	 offsets	 through	investments	 in	 greenhouse	 gas	 (“GHG”)	 reduction,	
avoidance,	and	sequestration	projects	 in	developing	countries	
(referred	to	as	“non-Annex	I	Parties”).	These	offsets,	called	Cer-
tified	Emission	Reduction	credits	(“CERs”),	are	equivalent	to	a	
reduction	in	one	metric	ton	of	carbon	dioxide	(“CO2”)
1	emitted	
to	the	atmosphere.	Developed	countries	(referred	to	as	“Annex	
I	Parties”)	can	use	CERs	to	cost-effectively	achieve	their	Kyoto	
Protocol	GHG	reduction	targets.
Over	the	past	several	years,	the	CDM	has	been	subject	to	a	
number	of	critiques,	many	of	which	call	into	question	the	pro-
gram’s	ability	to	generate	high	quality	offsets.	While	the	Off-
set	Quality	Initiative	(“OQI”)	neither	endorses	nor	opposes	the	
CDM,	this	paper	seeks	to	provide	an	impartial	description	of	the	
CDM	and	analyze	its	ability	to	ensure	offset	quality	in	the	future.	
Specifically,	this	paper	analyzes	the	CDM	through	the	prism	of	
the	core	criteria	for	offset	quality	outlined	in	OQI’s	white	paper	
titled	Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Green-
house Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy.2 
OQI	considers	the	CDM	process	for	addressing	each	criterion,	
assesses	 whether	 the	 process	 is	 sufficient	 to	 ensure	 quality,	
responds	to	related	critiques	of	the	CDM,	and	provides	recom-
mendations	for	improvement	where	appropriate.
Overall,	OQI	finds	that	the	CDM’s	processes	perform	suf-
ficiently	against	most	of	our	core	offset	quality	criteria,	and	with	
further	refinement	should	be	capable	of	performing	sufficiently	
against	 all	 criteria.	The	most	 significant	quality	 issues	 in	 the	
CDM	historically	have	had	to	do	with	additionality	and	the	reli-
ability	of	independent	third	party	verification.	These	issues	are	
common	across	all	GHG	offset	programs	and,	in	the	case	of	the	
CDM,	can	be	addressed	through	streamlining	and	standardizing	
the	additionality	tools	and	significantly	restructuring	the	third	
party	verification	system.	On	all	other	criteria,	OQI	finds	that	
the	CDM,	with	some	modification,	can	sufficiently	ensure	offset	
quality.
Key oFFseT QualITy crITerIa
OQI’s	“Offset	Policy	Design	Principles	and	Recommenda-
tions”3 establishes	a	set	of	eight	offset	quality	criteria.	Offsets	
should	(1)	be	additional,	(2)	be	based	on	a	realistic	baseline,	(3)	
be	accurately	quantified	and	monitored,	 (4)	be	 independently	
validated	and	verified,	(5)	be	unambiguously	owned,	(6)	address	
leakage,	(7)	address	permanence,	and	(8)	do	no	net	harm.
For	each	of	 these	criteria,	OQI	has	evaluated	 the	CDM’s	
performance,	related	critiques,	and	future	ability	to	satisfy	the	
criteria.	The	table	at	the	end	of	this	article	summarizes	the	results	
of	this	analysis.
oQi cRiteRia #1: offSetS ShoulD be aDDitional
Emission	reductions	resulting	from	offset	projects	should	
be	“in	addition”	to	reductions	that	would	have	occurred	without	
the	incentives	provided	by	the	existence	of	the	offset	program.	
To	determine	 if	 a	project	 is	 “additional,”	project	developers,	
auditors,	and	regulators	generally	rely	on	a	series	of	tests,	which	
identify	the	regulatory,	financial,	technical,	institutional,	com-
mon	practice,	and/or	other	barriers	to	a	project’s	implementation.
CDM	Process	for	Assuring	Additionality
To	 ensure	 that	 offsets	 are	 additional,	 the	CDM	 requires	
project	 participants	 to	 apply	 three	 additionality	 tests:4	 (1)	 a	
Regulatory	Test,	(2)	either	a	Barrier	Test	or	an	Investment	Test,	
and	(3)	a	Common	Practice	Test.	Project	participants	must	apply	
these	tests	on	a	project-by-project	basis	to	assess	the	unique	cir-
cumstances	of	each	proposed	activity.
The	Regulatory	Test	identifies	realistic	and	credible	alterna-
tives	to	the	CDM	project	that	are	in	compliance	with	all	man-
datory	and	enforceable	legal	and	regulatory	requirements,	even	
if	those	laws	and	regulations	have	objectives	other	than	GHG	
reductions.	 If	 the	proposed	project	 activity	 is	 the	only	viable	
alternative,	amongst	all	 the	practical	alternatives	 that	comply	
with	enforced	regulations,	then	the	proposed	CDM	project	is	not	
additional.5
The	Barrier	Test	examines	whether	there	are	hurdles	pre-
venting	the	project’s	implementation	in	the	absence	of	the	CDM.	
Barriers	must	be	significant,	realistic,	credible,	conservative,	and	
based	on	transparent	and	documented	evidence.	Examples	could	
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include	barriers	 related	 to	securing	 investment	or	 risk	associ-
ated	with	unfamiliar	technology.6	These	same	barriers	must	not	
affect,	or	must	affect	less	strongly,	reasonable	alternatives	to	the	
project	activity.
The	 Investment	Test	determines	whether	 a	CDM	project	
would	occur	without	offset	revenue.	In	the	CDM,	project	par-
ticipants	typically	make	investment-related	additionality	argu-
ments	based	on	the	internal	rate	of	return	(“IRR”)	of	a	project,	
both	with	and	without	CER	income.	If	the	project	activity	gen-
erates	no	revenue	aside	from	the	sale	of	CERs,	then	the	project	
participant	applies	a	simple	cost	analysis	to	document	project	
costs	and	to	demonstrate	 that	 there	is	at	 least	one	less	expen-
sive	alternative	to	the	project	activity.	If	the	activity	does gen-
erate	revenue	in	addition	to	CER	sales,	the	project	participant	
must	apply	either	(1)	an	investment	
comparison	analysis,	which	uses	
a	 project-appropriate	 financial	
indicator	 to	 compare	 the	 proj-
ect’s	performance	to	alternative	
activities;	 or	 (2)	 a	 benchmark	
analysis,	which	compares	a	stan-
dardized	market	indicator	to	the	
CDM	activity.	If	either	analysis	
indicates	 that	 there	 is	 a	 more	
financially	attractive	option	than	
undertaking	 the	 CDM	 project,	
the	 project	 passes	 this	 test.	 A	
Sensitivity	Test	is	also	required	
to	 ensure	 that	 the	 analytical	
assumptions	used	are	robust.7
Finally,	the	Common	Prac-
tice	Test	measures	 the	 sectoral	
and/or	 regional	 penetration	 of	
the	 proposed	 CDM	 activity	
(i.e.,	technology	or	practice).	If	
activities	 similar	 to	 the	 CDM	
project	 activity	 are	 common,	 the	
project	participant	must	demonstrate	that	the	project-specific	cir-
cumstances	are	somehow	unique;	otherwise,	the	project	is	not	
additional.8
If	a	project	fails	any	of	these	tests	(i.e.,	it	is	legally	required,	
is	the	most	economically	attractive	approach	and/or	barrier-free,	
or	is	common	practice)	the	project	is	not	additional	and	cannot	
generate	offsets	under	the	CDM.9
Critique:	The	CDM	Does	Not	Adequately	Ensure	
Additionality
A	number	of	past	critiques	have	questioned	the	effective-
ness	of	these	tests,	or	at	least	the	consistency	and	adequacy	of	
their	application	by	regulators.	Of	these,	perhaps	the	most	well	
known	critique	was	the	November	2007	paper	written	by	Lam-
bert	Schneider	on	behalf	of	the	World	Wildlife	Fund,	titled	Is 
the CDM Fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Develop-
ment Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for 
Improvement.10 The	media,	academic	literature,	and	trade	press	
cited Schneider’s	paper	widely	for	its	assertion	that	up	to	twenty	
percent	 of	 CERs—representing	 forty	 percent	 of	 CDM	 proj-
ects—may	have	been	non-additional.11	Schneider’s	paper	also	
argued	that	the	additionality	guidance	provided	under	the	CDM	
with	respect	to	barriers,	investment,	and	common	practice	tests	
was	too	subjective	and/or	insufficiently	specific.12
The	2008	paper	by	Stanford	University	Professors	Michael	
Wara	and	David	Victor	titled	A Realistic Policy on International 
Carbon Offsets	is	another	notable	critique	of	the	CDM’s	abil-
ity	 to	 ensure	project	 additionality.13	Wara	and	Victor	 largely	
focused	their	criticism	on	the	applications	for	CERs	made	by	
nearly	all	new	Chinese	renewable	energy	capacity	at	the	time,	
despite	 the	 Chinese	 government’s	 national	 policy	 goals	 that	
focused	on	 increasing	 investment	 in	 renewable	energy.14	The	
implication	of	 their	argument	was	
that	it	would	have	been	impos-
sible	 for	 all	 these	 projects	 to	
meet	 the	 CDM’s	 additional-
ity	 test,	 since	 at	 least	 some	 of	
the	 renewable	 energy	 capac-
ity	 brought	 online	 at	 the	 time	
must	 have	 been	 attributable	 to	
China’s	 energy	 policy,	 not	 the	
CDM.15	 They	 claimed	 that	 if	
the	 CDM’s	 additionality	 tests	
could	not	sift	out	the	additional	
from	non-additional	projects	 in	
this	 example,	 then	 they	 could	
not	 sufficiently	 ensure	 offset	
quality.16
Wara	and	Victor	also	criti-
cized	 the	 concept	 of	 offsets	
in	 general	 by	 asserting	 that	
increasingly	 burdensome	 tests	
would	 be	 required	 to	 suffi-
ciently	ensure	additionality	to	an	
acceptable	 level	 of	 offset	 quality,	
and	that	such	stringency	would	make	the	CDM	too	cumbersome	
to	function	effectively.17	Ultimately,	they	declared	that	“enthusi-
asm	[for	offsets]	is	misplaced	because	any	offset	market	of	suffi-
cient	scale	to	provide	substantial	cost-control	for	a	cap-and-trade	
program	will	involve	substantial	issuance	of	credits	that	do	not	
represent	real	emissions	reductions.”18
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	that	there	have	been	valid	concerns	
about	the	efficacy	of	both	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	
CDM’s	measures	to	ensure	additionality.	However,	the	recent	
rejection	of	a	number	of	proposed	Chinese	 renewable	energy	
CDM	projects	by	the	Executive	Board	(“EB”)	(the	body	respon-
sible	for	oversight	of	the	CDM)	on	additionality	grounds	indi-
cates	 that	CDM	executive	 leadership	and	staff	have	begun	 to	
address	at	least	some	of	the	aforementioned	quality	critiques.
Furthermore,	OQI	believes	that	issues	cited	in	the	past	con-
cerning	CDM	additionality	determinations	are	neither	endemic	
Overall, OQI finds that 
the CDM’s processes 
perform sufficiently 
against most of our core 
offset quality criteria, and 
with further refinement 
should be capable of 
performing sufficiently 
against all criteria.
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nor	 irreparable.	 Improvements	 in	 the	 past	 few	 years	 include	
the	 introduction	of	both	 the	Registration	and	Issuance	Teams	
(“RITs”)	and	additional	secretariat	staff	 that	provide	multiple	
layers	 of	 project	 review,	 summarize	 submissions,	 and	make	
recommendations,	all	of	which	 facilitate	 the	CDM	Executive	
Board’s	 review	and	decision	making	process.	The	Executive	
Board	review	and	rejection	rate	for	projects	has	increased	sig-
nificantly	 over	 the	past	 two	years.19	As	 the	Executive	Board	
undertakes	 reforms	 to	 incorporate	more	 objective,	 standard-
ized	criteria	into	additionality	determinations,	it	will	be	possible	
to	create	a	program	that	both	ensures	offset	quality	and	is	not	
overly	burdensome	or	administratively	complex.
Recommendation(s):	Broadly	speaking,	CDM	projects	fall	
into	one	of	two	categories,	which	largely	dictate	how	difficult	it	
is	to	assess	their	additionality.	For	projects	where	CDM	is	the	
sole	or	primary	source	of	revenue,	additionality	is	less	challeng-
ing	to	determine	because	there	are	no	other	expected	economic	
incentives	for	the	project	besides	the	CDM.
Projects	with	multiple	revenue	streams	are	more	challeng-
ing.	For	this	category,	the	CDM	could	improve	by	implement-
ing	a	more	rigorous	and	standardized	approach	for	determining	
additionality,	 consistent	with	 the	 recommendations	made	 by	
Lambert	Schneider.
Standardized	approaches	determine	additionality	based	on	
a	set	of	objective	eligibility	criteria,	which	consider	the	regula-
tory,	financial,	institutional,	and	technical	conditions	for	a	par-
ticular	project	type.	Generally,	standardized	approaches	involve	
the	 establishment	 of	 performance	benchmarks	 for	 both	 addi-
tionality	 and	 baselines.	However,	while	 a	more	 standardized	
approach	to	additionality	can	also	help	to	promote	offset	qual-
ity,	an	entirely	standardized	approach	would	be	challenging,	if	
not	impossible,	because	of	the	diversity	of	developing	country	
contexts.	Therefore,	“hybrid”	additionality	assessments,	which	
combine	elements	of	the	current	tests-based	approach	with	more	
project-type-specific	standardized	criteria,	can	help	balance	the	
strengths	and	weaknesses	of	these	respective	processes.	As	the	
CDM	grows	to	meet	increased	global	demand	for	international	
offsets,	 a	 hybrid	 approach	 to	 additionality	 can	 help	 stream-
line	the	project	cycle,	increasing	efficiency	while	maintaining	
quality.
Providing	more	detailed	guidance	 to	both	project	partici-
pants	and	independent	third	party	project	auditors	(referred	to	
as	“Designated	Operational	Entities,”	or	“DOEs”)	about	how	
to	determine	additionality	for	each	project	type,	and	providing	
standardized	 investment	 and	 analysis	 tools,	will	 improve	 the	
quality	of	the	CDM	while	also	reducing	transaction	costs	and	
administrative	burden.	As	the	first	large-scale	GHG	offset	pro-
gram	in	the	world,	the	CDM	is	already	incorporating	some	of	
these	recommendations	as	program	administrators	and	partici-
pants	learn	through	experience.
oQi cRiteRia #2: offSetS ShoulD be baSeD on a 
RealiStic baSeline
High	quality	offsets	should	be	measured	against	a	realis-
tic	baseline	in	order	to	achieve	a	transparent	and	conservative	
estimation	of	a	project’s	GHG	emission	reduction,	avoidance,	
and/or	removal.	A	baseline	is	an	estimate	of	the	GHG	emissions	
that	would	occur	in	the	absence	of	the	offset	project.	Whereas	
additionality	 involves	 demonstrating	 that	 a	 project	 activity	
would	not	have	occurred	in	the	absence	of	the	CDM,	baselines	
establish	 the	 plausible	 GHG	 emissions	 scenario	 without	 the	
project.
CDM	Process	for	Establishing	Baselines
Under	 the	CDM,	 project	 participants	 establish	 baselines	
according	to	guidelines	set	forth	in	an	approved	project	method-
ology.	A	methodology	defines	the	likely	emissions	sources	and	
sinks	in	the	absence	of	a	project.	The	CDM	specifies	the	follow-
ing	three	approaches	for	establishing	baselines:
1.	 Determining	that	the	most	likely	activity	in	the	
absence	of	the	project	would	be	continuance	of	the	
existing	activity.
2.	 Determining	if	an	economically	attractive	alternative	
exists	that	is	neither	the	existing	activity	nor	the	CDM	
project.	In	this	case,	the	emissions	associated	with	the	
most	economically	attractive	alternative	to	the	CDM	
project	would	constitute	the	baseline.
3.	 In	the	absence	of	a	clear	economically	attractive	
alternative,	the	baseline	is	based	on	the	average	
emissions	of	other	commonly	implemented	and	high	
performing	projects	in	the	sector.	Projects	must	have	
been	undertaken	in	the	past	five	years	and	have	similar	
geographic,	economic,	environmental,	political,	social,	
and	other	characteristics.20
For	example,	the	baseline	scenario	for	a	CDM	project	that	
proposes	to	capture	and	flare	landfill	gas	might	involve	a	plau-
sible	expectation	that	the	landfill	owner	would	normally	take	no	
action	to	reduce	or	capture	methane	at	the	site.21	In	this	case,	
baseline	emissions	would	equal	the	amount	of	methane	released	
from	the	site	without	any	gas	capture.	However,	this	is	a	fairly	
straightforward	example	and	it	is	possible	that	a	given	project	
will	have	multiple	plausible	baseline	scenarios	from	which	the	
project	participant	must	choose.
Critique:	CDM	Project-by-Project	Baseline	
Determinations	Are	Administratively	Burdensome
Some	market	participants	believe	the	CDM’s	approach	to	
baseline	determination	 is	 inadequately	 streamlined	and	deem	
the	process	to	be	overly	burdensome.	Project	participants	have	
argued	that	a	more	efficient	alternative	approach	would	be	 to	
establish	generic	benchmarks	or	default	emission	factors	for	par-
ticular	project	types,	which	would	allow	for	streamlined	estima-
tion	of	baseline	emissions.
Recently,	 the	CDM	has	begun	to	address	this	concern	by	
moving	away	from	project-specific	baseline	scenarios,	towards	
a	 hybrid	 approach	 that	 combines	 both	 project-specific	 and	
standardized	 evaluations.	 For	 example,	 the	 Executive	Board	
approved	a	methodology	in	2008	for	the	manufacture	of	energy-
efficient	 refrigerators,	 which	 takes	 a	 benchmarked	 approach	
to	 establishing	 project	 baselines.	As	 opposed	 to	 other	meth-
odologies	 that	 would	 require	 direct	 measurement	 of	 energy	
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consumption,	this	methodology	(“AM0070”)	sets	the	baseline	as	
the	manufacturing	of	“refrigerators	with	the	specific	electricity	
consumption	corresponding	to	the	calculated	benchmark	for	the	
respective	storage	volume	class.”22	In	other	words,	the	method-
ology	provides	a	standardized	baseline	with	a	default	factor	for	
calculating	the	energy	savings	of	various	refrigeration	devices.	
A	 degree	 of	 standardization	 is	 also	 underway	 for	 renewable	
energy	and	energy	efficiency	projects,	through	the	compilation	
of	standard	baseline	emission	factors	for	electricity	grids	in	sev-
eral	developing	countries,	such	as	India	and	South	Africa.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	 that	 the	CDM’s	approach	to	base-
line	establishment	is	generally	sufficient	to	ensure	offset	quality,	
although	a	transition	towards	more	standardized,	benchmarked	
baselines,	where	appropriate,	could	help	increase	administrative	
efficiency.	At	the	same	time,	OQI	acknowledges	that	develop-
ing	benchmark	baselines	requires	a	significant	amount	of	data,	
research,	and	work,	particularly	to	ensure	that	they	are	current,	
as	well	as	contextually	and	regionally	appropriate.
Recommendation(s):	Standardization	of	baselines	through	
benchmarking	 for	 some	 types	of	projects	may	be	appropriate	
and	more	efficient	in	the	CDM	moving	forward.	The	CDM	trend	
towards	benchmarking	baselines—as	in	the	case	of	the	AM0070	
with	efficient	refrigerators—can	streamline	the	project	develop-
ment	process	and	reduce	transaction	costs	and	investor	risk.
Similar	 to	 additionality,	 standardized	 baselines	 are	 not	
appropriate	 for	 activities	 and/or	 regions	 with	 heterogeneous	
characteristics	that	make	accurate	generalization	difficult.	Dis-
advantages	to	standardized	baselines	can	include	the	significant	
time	and	cost	associated	with	developing	rigorous	benchmarks	
across	a	broad	range	of	project	 types,	 limits	 to	the	amount	of	
appropriate	project	types,	and	difficulties	in	accounting	for	dif-
ferent	technological	and	market	conditions	across	regions	and	
regulatory	systems.	In	other	words,	while	standardized	baseline	
scenarios	may	be	appropriate	in	certain	countries	or	sectors	and	
for	certain	project	 types,	 they	may	be	 inappropriate	 for	 those	
with	substantial	project-specific	considerations.
offSet cRiteRia #3: offSetS ShoulD be accuRately 
QuantifieD & monitoReD
Offsets	should	be	accurately	quantified	and	monitored	 to	
ensure	that	only	real,	high-quality	emission	reductions	receive	
credits.	To	achieve	accuracy,	projects	should	have	monitoring	
plans	that	define	how,	when,	and	by	whom	data	will	be	collected	
and	emissions	quantified,	using	established	standards.
CDM	Process	for	Offset	Quantification	and	
Monitoring
The	 CDM	 requires	 that	 an	 approved	 monitoring	 plan	
for	 each	project	 be	 included	 in	 its	Project	Design	Document	
(“PDD”).23	CDM	methodologies	lay	out	detailed	rules	and	guid-
ance	on	quantification	 and	monitoring	 requirements	 for	 each	
project	type.	Each	project’s	monitoring	plan	must	specify	moni-
toring	and	quality	control	procedures,	necessary	data	for	collec-
tion,	measurement	accuracy	and	calibration	procedures,	the	type	
of	measurement	instruments,	and	who	is	responsible	for	moni-
toring.	Plans	must	also	address	the	monitoring	of	leakage	and	
be	available	to	the	public	online.24	Prior	to	project	registration,	
independent	auditors	must	validate	monitoring	plans.
Critique
In	certain	 instances,	 there	have	been	 individual	 technical	
issues	or	other	problems	with	methodologies.	However,	 revi-
sions	to	methodologies	have	corrected	these	issues	and,	broadly	
speaking,	there	have	been	no	significant	critiques	of	the	CDM’s	
ability	to	ensure	quality	offset	quantification	and	monitoring,	to	
date.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	that	the	CDM	has	strict	criteria	for	
emission	quantification	and	monitoring	that	sufficiently	ensures	
offset	quality.	Indeed,	the	CDM	has	served	as	a	model	for	emis-
sions	quantification	and	monitoring	procedures	 in	subsequent	
GHG	offset	programs	and	standards.
Recommendation(s):	 The	 CDM	 has	 a	 strong	 exist-
ing	 library	 of	methodologies	 that	 include	 accepted	monitor-
ing	and	quantification	formulas,	and	 that	have	preceded	most	
other	regional	and	international	standards.	In	certain	instances,	
requiring	the	application	of	internationally	recognized	technical	
standards	to	CDM	monitoring	plans	could	support	greater	stan-
dardization	of	data	across	projects	and	project	 types.	Explicit	
references	to	these	standards	also	will	give	project	participants	
and	 auditors	 greater	 clarity	 on	 the	 requirements	 for	 project	
implementation.
offSet cRiteRia #4: offSetS ShoulD be 
inDepenDently valiDateD & veRifieD
An	 independent	and	qualified	 third	party,	 free	 from	con-
flicts	of	 interest,	 should	audit	 (i.e.,	validate	projects	or	verify	
project	performance)	all	offset	projects	to	ensure	accuracy	and	
impartiality.	To	avoid	conflicts	of	interest,	auditor	compensation	
should	not	depend	on	whether	the	project	receives	CER	credits.	
Regulatory	offset	systems	should	have	accredited	auditors	and	
procedures	in	place	to	review	and	re-accredit,	suspend,	or	dis-
qualify	audit	organizations	on	an	ongoing	basis.
CDM	Process	for	Offset	Validation	and	Verification
Independent	third	party	auditors	in	the	CDM	are	called	Des-
ignated	Operational	Entities	(“DOEs”)	and	are	accredited	by	the	
CDM	Executive	Board	based	on	criteria	relating	largely	to	size,	
technical	competency,	and	management	ability.	DOEs	are	sub-
ject	to	random	spot-checks	and	periodic	review	by	the	Executive	
Board,	and	substandard	work	can	lead	to	fines,	suspension,	or	
revocation	of	a	DOE’s	accreditation.25
An	independent	auditor	must	validate	the	PDD	(i.e.,	proj-
ect	validation)	prior	to	registration	of	the	project	by	the	CDM.	
Prior	to	CER	issuance	by	the	CDM,	an	independent	auditor	must	
verify	 the	emission	reductions	based	on	ex post	data	on	proj-
ect	performance.	Project	participants	contract	DOEs	to	perform	
these	audits,	and	pay	the	DOEs	for	services	directly.	The	use	of	
different	DOEs26	at	the	validation	and	verification	stages	in	the	
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project	cycle	is	intended	to	ensure	that	the	second	audit	is	not	
biased	by	findings	of	the	earlier	audit.27
Critique:	Some	Independent	Third	Party	Verifiers	
(DOEs)	Have	Not	Sufficiently	Evaluated,	Validated,	
and	Verified	Projects	to	Date
Some	third	party	verifiers	under	the	CDM	have	been	criti-
cized	for	a	 lack	of	capacity	and	competency	to	undertake	 the	
level	of	quality	checks	required	to	ensure	offset	quality.	In	addi-
tion,	because	DOEs	compete	with	one	another	for	business,	there	
has	been	concern	that	they	could	be	driven	to	lower	the	quality	
of	their	audits	to	remain	competitive	and	profitable.	Questions	
surrounding	potential	conflicts	of	interest	for	DOEs	also	exist,	
because	project	participants	hire	and	then	pay	DOEs	themselves.
One	example	of	the	issues	surrounding	third	party	verifica-
tion	emerged	in	November	2008,	when	the	largest	CDM	project	
auditor,	Norway’s	Det	Norske	Veritas	(“DNV”),	had	its	accredi-
tation	suspended	by	the	Executive	Board	for	five	alleged	non-
conformities	related	to	its	validation	and	verification	practices.28	
The	suspension	meant	that	DNV	could	not	submit	projects	for	
registration	or	request	issuance	of	CERs	for	clients.	At	least	in	
part,	the	suspension	reflected	a	move	by	the	Executive	Board	to	
tighten	rules	and	ensure	that	CDM	projects	meet	more	stringent	
offset	quality	standards.	A	second	verifier	suspension,	this	time	
of	 the	firm	SGS	United	Kingdom	Limited	 (“SGS”),	 signifies	
continued	vigilance	by	the	Executive	Board.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	DNV’s	suspension	and	later	reinstatement,	as	
well	 as	SGS’	 recent	 suspension,	 indicate	 that	 procedures	 for	
spot-checks	 and	 periodic	 evaluation	 as	 well	 as	 oversight	 of	
DOEs	by	 the	Executive	Board	 is	 improving.	However,	more	
training,	 guidance,	 experience,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 stan-
dardized	protocols	for	auditing	are	needed,	as	well	as	consensus	
on	what	constitutes	validation	and/or	verification	best	practices.	
Some	progress	has	been	made	in	this	regard,	with	the	adoption	
of	 the	 Validation	 and	 Verification	Manual	 (“VVM”)	 by	 the	
CDM	Executive	Board	in	2008.29
Recommendation(s):	Significant	 reforms	 are	 needed	 to	
better	train	DOE	staff,	to	align	the	incentive	structures	of	third	
party	validation	and	verification,	and	to	ensure	greater	oversight	
of	DOEs	by	the	Executive	Board.
Individuals	employed	by	DOEs	should	be	required	to	meet	
a	minimum	level	of	training,	modeled	after	the	existing	training	
program	for	Expert	Review	Team	members	that	review	national	
inventories	 submitted	 under	 the	 United	 Nations	 Framework	
Convention	on	Climate	Change	and	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	To	be	
on	a	verification	team,	individual	auditors	should	have	to	com-
plete	this	training	and	pass	an	exam,	supplementing	this	training	
with	their	own	training	on	internal	systems	and	procedures.
To	align	incentives	and	avoid	potential	conflicts	of	interest,	
a	neutral	party	could	assign	DOEs	to	projects	instead	of	project	
participants	hiring	DOEs	themselves.	For	example,	the	Execu-
tive	Board	could	assign	DOEs,	operating	under	a	predetermined	
fee	structure,	to	projects.
In	 addition,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	CDM	Accreditation	 Panel	
(which	oversees	DOEs)	to	assess	whether	DOEs	have	the	capac-
ity	and	competency	to	justify	accreditation	could	be	strengthened	
through	mandatory	training	and	testing	for	Accreditation	Panel	
members	and	support	personnel.	To	accomplish	this,	employees	
must	be	specifically	hired	and	trained	to	achieve	this	goal.
Finally,	continual	updates	and	improvements	to	the	Valida-
tion	and	Verification	Manual	are	essential	to	ensure	that	DOEs,	
project	participants,	and	the	Executive	Board	have	a	clear	under-
standing	of	the	materiality	of	each	requirement	to	the	quality	of	
a	project’s	validation	and	verification.30
offSet cRiteRia #5: offSetS ShoulD be 
unambiguouSly owneD
Offsets	should	have	a	single	owner	with	clear	rights	to	the	
credits	 so	 that	 the	emission	 reductions	 they	 represent	are	not	
claimed	twice.	“Double-counting”	can	be	further	prevented	by	
ensuring	credits	are	serialized	and	accounted	for	 in	a	registry	
where	transfer	of	ownership	can	be	clearly	documented.
CDM	Process	for	Ensuring	Unambiguous	Ownership
Before	any	offset	project	 activity	can	move	 forward,	 the	
Designated	National	Authority	(“DNA”)31	of	the	host	country	
must	approve	 the	project	on	behalf	of	 that	nation’s	sovereign	
government.	 The	 DNA	 is	 thereby	 responsible	 for	 assigning	
unambiguous	ownership	rights	to	emission	reduction	credits	to	
project	participants.
Furthermore,	all	CDM	credits	have	individual	serial	num-
bers	 and	 a	UN	 registry	 that	meets	 international	 best	 practice	
standards	 for	 accounting	 and	 transactions,	 like	 those	 used	 in	
financial	 banking	 systems.	 The	 registry	 uses	 unique	 account	
numbers	 for	 all	 participants,	 and	 participants	may	 hold	 each	
CER	in	one	account	at	a	time.	Information	in	the	registry	is	pub-
licly	available	on	the	Internet.32
Critique
No	significant	critiques	exist	to	date	on	the	CDM’s	ability	to	
ensure	unambiguous	ownership.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	that	the	CDM	is	generally	sufficient	
to	ensure	that	offset	credits	are	unambiguously	owned.	In	partic-
ular,	because	the	CDM	gives	developing	countries	the	ultimate	
power	 to	approve	offset	 issuance,	 the	 system	 is	 structured	 to	
respect	domestic	sovereignty	and	ensure	clear	ownership	under	
domestic	law,	while	simultaneously	ensuring	that	international	
ownership	transactions	are	clear	and	credible.	Furthermore,	the	
serialization	and	registry	accounting	system	promotes	unambig-
uous	ownership	by	allowing	credit	transfers	and	retirements	in	a	
transparent	fashion.
Recommendation(s):	Requiring	host	country	recognition	
of	CER	ownership	creates	 a	 robust	mechanism	 for	 establish-
ing	unambiguous	credit	ownership	and	for	prevention	of	dou-
ble-counting.	 Improving	national-level	 governance	 structures	
through	training	and	capacity-building	would	help	DNAs	do	an	
even	better	job	of	avoiding	any	ambiguous	ownership	issues	that	
may	occur	in	the	future.
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offSet cRiteRia #6: offSetS ShoulD aDDReSS 
leakage
Leakage	 is	 an	 increase	 in	 emissions	 outside	 of	 an	offset	
project’s	boundaries	that	occurs	as	a	direct	result	of	the	project’s	
implementation.	To	account	for	leakage,	methodologies	should	
define	a	“project	boundary”	which	specifies	the	GHG	sources	
and	sinks	for	which	project	participants	are	responsible.	Meth-
odologies	also	should	explain	how	the	project	will	quantify	any	
significant	changes	in	emissions	outside	the	project	boundary.	
Offset	programs	should	require	that	project	participants	evaluate	
potential	leakage	effects,	and	that	monitoring	plans	account	for	
actual	effects	over	the	life	of	a	project.
CDM	Process	for	Addressing	Leakage
In	general,	project	participants	must	either	demonstrate	that	
leakage	is	unlikely	to	occur,	or	monitor	and	quantify	unavoid-
able	leakage	and	deduct	it	from	the	total	credited	emission	reduc-
tions	by	using	procedures	and	formulas	prescribed	by	the	project	
methodology.	For	example,	projects	that	use	wood	waste	instead	
of	fossil	fuel	in	thermal	boilers	can	cause	leakage	if	wood	waste	
is	in	short	supply,	and	other	local	wood-fired	boilers	switch	back	
to	 fossil	 fuels.	The	CDM	methodology	(“AM-0036”)	 for	 this	
kind	of	project	requires	project	participants	to	demonstrate	that	
wood	waste	is	abundant.	If	such	a	demonstration	is	not	possible,	
project	 participants	must	 calculate	 the	 increase	 in	 fossil	 fuel	
emissions	likely	to	occur	at	other	boilers	as	a	result,	and	must	
deduct	this	from	the	total	creditable	reductions.33
Critique
No	significant	critiques	exist	to	date	on	the	CDM’s	ability	
to	address	leakage.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	that	the	CDM	has	methodologies	that	
estimate	leakage	conservatively	for	most	project	types,	and	its	
approach	to	addressing	leakage	is	generally	sufficient	to	ensure	
offset	quality.
Recommendation(s):	OQI	 recommends	 that	 the	 CDM	
continue	to	use	a	conservative	approach	in	identifying	and	miti-
gating	leakage	issues,	that	it	require	all	project	types	to	address	
leakage,	and	that	it	provide	methodological	guidelines	for	esti-
mating	leakage	at	a	level	commensurate	with	the	project	type’s	
complexity	and	risk.
offSet cRiteRia #7: offSetS ShoulD aDDReSS 
peRmanence
For	certain	project	types,	there	is	a	risk	that	emission	reduc-
tions	generated	are	subject	to	reversal,	and	therefore	could	fail	to	
offset	emissions	permanently.	For	example,	a	forest	fire,	weather	
event,	or	pest	attack	could	release	into	the	atmosphere	carbon	
stored	 by	 a	 forestry	 project.	 Therefore,	 regulatory	 regimes	
should	address	permanence	to	ensure	the	minimization	of	loss	in	
the	event	of	a	reversal.
CDM	Process	for	Addressing	Permanence
In	the	case	of	afforestation/reforestation	(“AR”)	projects,	
the	CDM	addresses	permanence	concerns	by	issuing	temporary	
credits	that	expire	at	a	predetermined	time.	Once	a	credit	expires,	
the	owner	must	replace	it	with	another	valid	credit	or	emission	
allowance	unit.34	For	example,	if	a	country	uses	a	reforestation	
credit	to	comply	with	its	obligations	under	the	Kyoto	protocol	
in	2010	and	 the	credit	expires	 in	2020,	 the	country	will	have	
to	submit	a	replacement	credit	or	allowance	in	2020	to	remain	
in	compliance	with	its	2010	obligations.	A	significant	disadvan-
tage	of	temporary	crediting	is	that	it	 treats	all	forestry	carbon	
as	 short-lived,	 even	where	 reversals	may	 not	 have	 occurred.	
The	result	is	increased	financial	risk	and	uncertainty	for	buyers,	
which	creates	a	disincentive	for	project	participants	to	invest	in	
forestry	projects.
Critique
No	significant	critiques	exist	to	date	on	the	CDM’s	ability	to	
ensure	permanence.	However,	critiques	do	exist	about	the	effi-
cacy	of	temporary	crediting	with	respect	to	promoting	invest-
ment	in	carbon	sequestration	projects.
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	 that,	while	 temporary	 crediting	 is	
sufficient	to	ensure	offset	quality,	the	CDM’s	current	approach	
may	be	overly	conservative,	as	 it	creates	 investor	uncertainty	
and	has	led	to	minimal	investments	in	forestry	projects	under	the	
CDM	to	date.
Recommendation(s):	 OQI	 recommends	 investigating	
alternate	 ways	 to	 address	 permanence.	 For	 example,	 policy	
mechanisms	that	address	reversal	risk	could	provide	more	mar-
ket	certainty	than	temporary	crediting	mechanisms.	Some	GHG	
programs	in	voluntary	and	pre-compliance	markets	are	explor-
ing	and	testing	buffer	pools	and	the	use	of	insurance	and	other	
financial	products	as	alternatives	to	temporary	crediting.	Buffer	
pools,	for	instance,	address	reversal	risk	by	evaluating	the	risk	
profile	of	a	project,	and	then	requiring	project	participants	to	set	
aside	a	portion	of	the	offsets,	based	on	the	results	of	applying	
a	methodology	to	determine	risk	and	buffer	size,	into	a	shared	
buffer	pool.	In	the	event	of	a	reversal,	project	participants	use	
credits	from	this	pool	to	account	for	negated	sequestered	tons.	
As	another	example,	insurance	products	work	much	like	other	
traditional	 types	of	 insurance,	 addressing	 risk	by	making	 the	
project	whole	by	guaranteeing	a	replacement	price	for	offsets	
equivalent	to	the	loss.	Although	applying	these	mechanisms	in	
many	developing	countries	may	be	challenging,	from	a	market	
and	investment	perspective	they	could	provide	a	more	efficient,	
certain,	and	cost-effective	approach	than	temporary	crediting.
offSet cRiteRia #8: offSet pRoJectS ShoulD Do no 
net haRm
Offset	projects	 should	not	cause	or	contribute	 to	adverse	
effects	on	human	health	or	 the	environment,	and	should	seek	
to	 provide	 health	 and	 environmental	 co-benefits	 whenever	
possible.
CDM	Process	for	Ensuring	No	Net	Harm
To	 ensure	 that	 offset	 projects	 do	 no	 net	 harm,	 the	CDM	
requires	project	participants	to	sponsor	a	stakeholder	consultation	
process	during	the	project	design	phase.	During	the	consultation	
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process,	submissions	of	public	comments	on	the	project	activity	
must	be	solicited,	and	in-person	stakeholder	meetings	must	be	
held	in	the	local	community.35	Project	participants	are	required	
to	undertake	good	faith	efforts	to	publicize	the	event	and	make	
materials	 available	 in	 the	 language	of	 local	 constituents.	The	
PDD	must	 include	 a	 summary	 of	 any	 stakeholder	 comments	
received	 during	 the	 public	 comment	 period	 and	 describe	 any	
anticipated	environmental,	economic,	and/or	social	impacts.	The	
project	must	then	be	approved	by	the	host	country	government	
and	be	found	consistent	with	its	sustainable	development	goals,	
as	well	as	environmental	and	other	regulations.36
Critique:	CDM	Projects	Sometimes	Cause	Local	
Environmental	and/or	Social	Harm,	and/or	Fail	to	
Promote	Sustainable	Development
A	small	number	of	CDM	projects	have	come	under	criticism	
for	causing	 local	 environmental	or	 social	harm.	For	example,	
a	 number	 of	 environmental	 non-governmental	 organizations	
(“NGOs”)	 including	 International	Rivers,	 the	Center	 for	Bio-
logical	Diversity	(“CBD”),	and	the	Natural	Resources	Defense	
Council	(“NRDC”)	submitted	comments	to	oppose	the	validation	
of	a	hydroelectric	project	in	Panama	sponsored	by	AES	Corpo-
ration.	The	NGOs	claimed	the	project	would	have	threatened	a	
biologically	rich	World	Heritage	Site	and	the	indigenous	Ngobe	
tribe.37
Another	related	critique	frequently	levied	against	the	CDM	
is	that	it	has	failed	to	meet	one	of	its	primary	objectives:	to	assist	
developing	 countries	 in	 achieving	 sustainable	 development.	
While	failing	to	promote	sustainable	development	is	not	neces-
sarily	equivalent	to	doing	net	harm,	it	is	worth	mentioning	in	this	
paper	because	of	the	prevalence	of	this	criticism	in	debates	over	
the	CDM	to	date.
According	to	Schneider:
The	 actual	 impact	 of	 CDM	 projects	 on	 sustainable	
development	 is	difficult	 to	 assess	because	 it	 depends	
on	the	definition	of	sustainable	development	which	is	
defined	by	most	countries	in	very	broad	terms.	Many	
countries	 have	 established	 and	 published	 criteria	 to	
assess	 whether	 a	 project	 contributes	 to	 sustainable	
development.	 However,	 they	 are	 often	 very	 general	
.	.	.	[F]ew	[projects]	comply	with	criteria	that	are	related	
to	 the	 achievement	 of	 the	Millennium	Development	
Goals.	For	example,	many	CDM	projects,	directly	or	
indirectly,	reduce	air	pollution	or	contribute	to	the	dif-
fusion	of	environmentally	sound	technologies,	whereas	
only	very	 few	projects	directly	 contribute	 to	poverty	
alleviation.38
OQI	Findings	&	Recommendations
Finding(s):	OQI	finds	that	the	CDM’s	approach	to	prevent-
ing	net	harm	is	generally	sufficient	to	ensure	offset	quality	by	
creating	opportunities	 for	public	participation	and	giving	host	
countries	recourse	to	reject	projects	if	they	fail	to	consider	and	
incorporate	stakeholder	concerns	and	sustainable	development	
goals.	However,	OQI	acknowledges	 that	ensuring	absolute	no	
net	harm	of	all	offset	projects	is	difficult,	since	in	all	cases	some	
trade-offs	are	likely	to	exist.	For	example,	a	landfill	gas	capture	
system	may	reduce	a	number	of	trace	pollutants	that	can	cause	
unpleasant	odor	and	smog	due	to	ground-level	ozone.	However,	
it	may	also	displace	impoverished	people	who	rely	on	scaveng-
ing	the	landfill	as	the	basis	of	their	livelihood.
On	the	question	of	whether	the	CDM	sufficiently	contributes	
to	sustainable	development,	OQI	generally	concurs	with	Lambert	
Schneider	that	such	a	determination	is	difficult	to	make	because	
definitions	 of	 sustainable	 development	 differ	 significantly	
between	countries,	and	are	often	broad,	vague,	or	multifarious.
Recommendation(s):	The	CDM	Executive	Board	should	
continue	 to	work	 towards	 ensuring	 that	 offset	 projects	 do	 no	
net	harm.	Programs	 to	 engage	and	educate	 local	 stakeholders	
so	 they	understand	 the	purpose	and	 impacts	of	offset	projects	
will	improve	the	CDM’s	ability	to	prevent	net	harm.	Improving	
national-level	governance	structures,	through	training	and	capac-
ity-building,	would	further	help	DNAs	develop	and	apply	their	
own	sustainable	development	criteria	and	evaluation	processes.
conclusIon
OQI	finds	that,	with	some	improvements,	the	CDM	can	pro-
vide	an	acceptable	assurance	of	project	additionality	and	base-
lines.	Recent	trends	towards	standardization	and	benchmarking	
of	both	additionality	and	baselines	should	continue	to	improve	
quality.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	standardized	approaches	
are	often	advocated	in	principle,	in	reality	some	project	types	are	
less	amenable	to	standardization,	and	variations	across	regions	
and	 contexts	 require	 consideration	 and	flexibility.	OQI	notes	
that	expert	judgment	will	remain	an	important	complement	to	
standardized	approaches.
There	are	still	challenges	to	address	and	further	improve-
ments	to	make.	Project-by-project	additionality	determinations	
remain	administratively	burdensome	and	susceptible	to	subjec-
tivity	and	inconsistency;	as	such,	movement	towards	a	hybrid	
approach	would	help	streamline	the	process	and	increase	effi-
ciency	while	maintaining	quality.	Significant	improvements	to	
the	 third	 party	 verification	 process	 are	 needed,	 and	 potential	
conflicts	of	interest	could	be	minimized	if	DOEs	are	not	selected	
by	project	participants.	New	policy	mechanisms	 that	 address	
reversal	 risk	can	ensure	permanence	without	constraining	 the	
market.
On	the	whole,	based	on	the	assessment	criteria	established	in	
Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse 
Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy,39	OQI	
finds	that	the	CDM	is	generally	able	to	ensure	sufficient	offset	
quality.	As	our	recommendations	continue	to	be	addressed,	par-
ticularly	those	regarding	additionality	determination	and	third	
party	 validation/verification,	 the	CDM	could	 provide	 quality	
international	offset	credits	for	use	in	a	future	U.S.	cap-and-trade	
program.
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APPENDIX	1:	The	CDM	Project	Cycle
The	CDM	process	involves	two	stages:	project	design	and	project	implementation.	The	CDM	requires	a	number	of	documents	at	
various	points	in	both	stages	to	demonstrate	that	a	project	meets	the	CDM’s	requirements.
	 Stage	I:	Project	Design	 Stage	II:	Project	Implementation
Stage	I	begins	with	the	project	planning	phase,	where	proj-
ect	participants	prepare	a	document	describing	the	project,	and	
get	written	approval	from	each	country	involved.40	Among	other	
things,	 the	written	approval	must	show	that	 the	CDM	project	
supports	the	host	country’s	sustainable	development	goals.
In	the	project	document	preparation	phase,	project	partici-
pants	complete	a	Project	Design	Document	(“PDD”).	The	PDD	
is	a	comprehensive	document	that	explains	how	the	project	meets	
the	CDM’s	additionality	tests	for	the	activity	in	question.	The	
PDD	also	describes	the	project’s	geographic	boundary,	how	the	
GHG	reductions	will	be	monitored	and	estimated,	and	the	period	
of	 time	the	project	participant	seeks	 to	receive	credits.41	Fur-
ther,	the	PDD	summarizes	any	stakeholder	comments	received	
during	 the	 public	 comment	 period,	 describes	 any	 anticipated	
environmental,	economic,	and/or	social	impacts,	and	shows	the	
average	annual	reductions	and	total	CER	volume	expected	over	
the	project’s	creditable	lifetime.	In	general,	project	participants	
develop	projects	according	to	standardized	project	“methodolo-
gies,”	or	blueprints,	which	the	CDM	Executive	Board	approves.	
These	methodologies	outline	the	steps	for	undertaking	a	variety	
of	creditable	GHG	reducing	activities.
Before	 the	 project	 can	 be	 officially	 “registered”	 by	 the	
Executive	Board	 (“EB”),	 an	 independent	 third	 party	 auditor,	
called	a	Designated	Operational	Entity	(“DOE”),42	must	review	
the	project	activity	and	documentation	against	the	requirements	
of	 the	CDM.	The	DOE	checks	all	 information	 in	 the	PDD	to	
ensure	transparency	and	rigor	in	data,	calculations,	and	addition-
ality	arguments,	and	may	come	back	to	the	project	participant	
with	requests	for	clarifications.	The	DOE	also	conducts	a	site	
visit	 to	the	project	 to	ground-truth	the	project	documentation,	
and	if	 they	find	that	 the	project	meets	all	established	require-
ments,	they	submit	a	validation	report	to	the	EB,	which	may	reg-
ister	or	reject	the	project,	or	request	clarifications	if	necessary.
Once	the	EB	registers	the	project,	the	implementation	stage	
begins	with	the	monitoring	phase.	Project	participants	must	col-
lect	and	analyze	data	from	the	project,	according	to	standard-
ized	procedures	established	in	the	project’s	methodology.	The	
project	participant	must	continually	monitor	the	project	over	its	
creditable	lifetime	and	calculate	the	GHG	reductions	the	project	
has	achieved	to	successfully	receive	CER	credits.
In	 the	verification	and	certification	phase,	project	partici-
pants	again	retain	a	DOE,	this	time	to	verify	the	project’s	GHG	
reductions	as	documented	by	the	data	acquired	during	the	proj-
ect	monitoring	process.	Once	the	DOE	reviews	and	verifies	the	
data,	they	submit	paperwork	certifying	the	accuracy	of	the	GHG	
reductions	to	the	EB,	and	request	issuance	of	CER	credits	to	the	
project	participant.
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